Public opinion scholars have long debated whether citizens formulate coherent attitudes when evaluating military conflicts (see Aldrich et al. (2006) for a review). Research initially portrayed public opinion on these issues as ill-informed and lacking coherent structure (Almond 1950) . However, recent studies have concluded that the public's support for military interventions reacts rationally to information about how the war is proceeding, particularly with regard to the number of American casualties (Mueller 1973; Gartner 2008) , though these reactions are conditioned by the public's beliefs about the merits of the conflict and the likelihood of success (Gelpi et al. 2005) . Other scholars have called into question these findings, positing instead that elite cues are most influential in affecting support for war. Specifically, this body of work has demonstrated that when there is elite consensus about a military conflict, the public tends to support the effort while elite divisions tend to generate more opposition (Berinsky 2009; Gelpi et al. 2009 ).
While scholars have devoted significant attention to understanding public opinion toward ongoing wars, there has been less attention to how the public forms opinions about potential military conflicts, partly because assessing support for a potential military intervention places an even greater burden on the average individual. When evaluating an ongoing conflict, citizens can rely on information about how the war is going and elite interpretations of that information to help formulate their opinions. However, when assessing a proposed military intervention, individuals must cope with the inherent uncertainty involved in making prospective judgments about the potential consequences of taking such action. Dalton (1996) notes that, "[p]rospective judgments are based on a speculative and complex decision-making process. [...] a task that imposes a considerable information burden on the voter" (p. 223). In such an uncertain climate, citizens may react more to new pieces of information or cues from elites (Berinsky 2009; Gelpi et al. 2009 ). They also may base their opinions on the stated policy objectives of the proposed intervention (Jentleson 1992) as well as ethnocentrism (Kam and Kinder 2008) .
Even when individuals can rely on elite cues and other sources of information to formulate expectations about the merits and likely success of a military intervention, they are making these calculations under substantial uncertainty. In other words, the decision of whether to support or oppose a proposed military intervention is one that includes significant risk, a factor that may also influence how citizens approach the decision. Recent work indicates that considerations of risk may play an important role in affecting individuals' vote decisions and attitudes on political issues (e.g., Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Kam and Simas 2010) . While individuals may consider risks relative to any policy proposal, these considerations may be particularly influential when it comes to evaluating whether to send troops into harm's way. Slovic et al. (1979) note that perception of risk is significantly influenced by the characteristics of the hazard that the individual is evaluating. A hazard with high levels of dread is one that would have catastrophic, sensational and fatal consequences, and one which the individual feels no sense of control over. Individuals will be particularly averse to such risks. The hazards of war are often catastrophic and fatal; thus, the potential exists for risk to weigh heavily on evaluations of whether to go to war.
However, individuals may not always consider risk when offering their opinions on a potential military intervention. When volunteering their opinions, citizens often forego an exhaustive search for information and rely instead on considerations that are most accessible to them at that moment (Zaller 1992) . In fact, people may hold different attitudes on the same issue at different points in time because different considerations are more or less accessible to them at that moment. The accessibility of a particular concept or consideration-such as risk-can be influenced by how frequently or how recently those concepts have been activated in the person's mind. Priming occurs when a consideration is activated by external stimuli, such as elite rhetoric or alterations in the wording of a survey question. When individuals are primed to think about risk, they may be less likely to support sending troops into harm's way.
Of course, considerations of risk may not be equally influential to every individual's opinion. As Kam and Simas (2010) demonstrate, some individuals are more tolerant of risk than others and Nadeau et al. (1999) demonstrate that individuals who are less accepting of risk tend to give more weight to the worst possible outcome when faced with a proposal for political change. In such a climate, priming a risk-averse individual to think about risk may cause them to become less supportive of intervention while those who are more tolerant of risk may be less influenced by such a prime.
The Survey Experiment
To best determine how risk influences the public's support for entering into military conflicts, we chose the case of Darfur. Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, America did not intervene militarily in Darfur, allowing us to use the case to gauge attitudes toward a potential military conflict. However, while the U.S. had not engaged in Darfur, politicians and advocacy organizations were active in placing the issue of intervention on the political agenda. During the 2008 campaign, every major contender for the presidency took a position on the extent to which they would intervene in Darfur. Since the principal policy objective in Darfur would be humanitarian (to end the ethnic genocide) and U.S. involvement would be part of a multinational operation, support should be relatively high (Jentleson and Britton 1998) .
To answer these questions, we embedded an experiment in a module of the 2008
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, a national internet survey of 1,000 American adults conducted through YouGov/Polimetrix (Appendix 1). Each respondent answered identical questions about four policy proposals. The sample was randomly divided into control and treatment groups. The control group received instructions to "Please indicate whether you approve or disapprove of the proposals." The treatment group received a slightly different version of the preface designed to prime the respondents to think about risk before they answered the questions. This preface read, "Keeping in mind that policies always involve some amount of risk, please indicate whether you approve or disapprove of the proposals." Among the four proposals respondents were asked to evaluate was "The use of US troops in Darfur as part of a multinational force to help end the ethnic genocide there." 1 It is important to note that the treatment employed in this experiment was fairly subtle.
The addition of a phrase referring to risk is only a slight change to the instrument to which control group respondents were exposed. Furthermore, this alteration was confined to the instructions that appeared at the top of the page, something that many respondents might glance at quickly as they worked through the survey. Thus, on one hand, it would not be surprising to find limited differences between respondents in the control and treatment groups. On the other hand, if risk is as powerful a determinant of decision making as much of the literature suggests, then even a subtle treatment should induce significant differences.
As noted above, we expect those who are least tolerant of risk will be most influenced by the priming condition. To measure risk tolerance, we employed a survey instrument developed and tested by Barsky et al. (1997) . The measure of risk tolerance was developed from a twoquestion battery on the survey.
2 Figure 1 presents the questions used to determine each respondent's level of risk tolerance. As the figure indicates, the two-question survey instrument generates a four-point scale of risk tolerance ranging from 0 (low tolerance for risk) to 3 (high tolerance for risk). A majority (53%) of respondents scored lowest on the scale of risk tolerance while 17% had the highest level of risk tolerance. Appendix 2 includes additional information about our measure of risk tolerance. In the analysis that follows we expect to find particularly strong risk priming effects for those who scored a 0 on this scale since those respondents would likely be most sensitive to considerations of risk. proposal, respondents were given the option of answering that they "strongly approved," "somewhat approved," "somewhat disapproved," "strongly disapproved," or "did not know."
Results
The table presents two sets of results. In the first three columns, the table shows the extent to which the risk prime affected the percentage of respondents who offered a "don't know" answer.
The second set of columns presents the support for intervention in Darfur among those who took a position.
While the expectations related to the "don't know" responses are not entirely obvious, it would not be surprising to find that the prime causes a significant proportion of risk-averse respondents to move from "don't know" to being opposed to the intervention. After all, given the challenge of formulating an opinion in such an uncertain context, these risk-averse respondents may use the prime as a cue about the likelihood of success. Indeed, this is what Table 1 reveals: the most risk-averse respondents become more likely to take a position when treated with the risk prime ("don't know" responses decline by 7% under the priming condition, p<.1). This increased propensity to offer an opinion under the priming condition resulted in reduced support for the proposal. Support was 68% among risk intolerant respondents who did not receive the risk prime but just 53% for those who did receive this prime. The difference in proportions was significant at p<.05, indicating a high level of confidence that the priming effect is generalizable to the population of Americans who are relatively intolerant of risk.
Similar differences in support were not evident among respondents who were more tolerant of risk. For example, the risk prime generated virtually no difference in support for military intervention in Darfur for individuals who received either a 1 or 3 on the risk tolerance scale. Respondents who were rated as a 2 for risk tolerance actually became more supportive of intervention of Darfur when primed to think about risk. However, because of the small number of respondents in this condition, the difference is statistically insignificant and may very well be due to sampling error (p=.23).
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Notably, Table 1 reveals that respondents in the most risk-tolerant group were five times more likely to answer "don't know" when primed. This increase in "don't know" responses does not come disproportionately from supporters or opponents--support for intervention is the same regardless of whether a risk-tolerant respondent received the prime. It may be that more risktolerant individuals are less likely to have naturally considered the risks involved in taking military action in Darfur. Thus, when primed to think about risk, a significant share of supporters and opponents may decide that they have not given enough considerations to these risks to offer an opinion on intervention.
Overall, the findings presented in Table 1 provide support for our expectation that priming risk intolerant individuals to think about risk will reduce their support for military intervention. While random assignment of our control and treatment conditions should obviate any concerns that these findings are spurious, we do have to be conscious of the fact that the patterns for different levels of risk tolerance may actually be attributable to some other variable that is correlated with tolerance for risk. For example, if less-educated respondents are less tolerant of risk, then the effects reported in Table 1 may be due to the fact that those with lower levels of formal education are more susceptible to priming effects in general.
To determine how confident we can be in the findings presented in Table 1 , and to help control for some of these factors, we estimated a logit model where support for military intervention in Darfur is the dependent variable. We include in this model an indicator for whether the individual received the risk prime, the level of risk tolerance for the individual, and an interaction term between those variables. In addition, we also include several control variables that might also be related to support for intervention in Darfur along with interactions between each of these control variables and the risk prime indicator.
5 Table 2 presents the results from this model. Two interaction terms are statistically significant-(1) the interaction between the risk prime and ideology and (2) that between the risk prime and risk tolerance. The predicted probabilities for these relationships are plotted in Figure   2 . With regard to ideology, both liberals and conservatives became more supportive of intervention when risk was primed, but the effect was stronger for conservatives. Conservatives may have interpreted the risk prime as a liberal argument against intervention, and therefore reacted by taking the opposing position (in favor of action). The figure also shows that respondents who were least tolerant of risk were somewhat less likely to support intervention in Darfur under the risk priming condition. However, the most risk-tolerant respondents actually became more supportive of intervention when primed to think about risk. Thus, when risk was not primed, a respondent with a lower tolerance for risk would be expected to favor intervention more than a respondent with a higher risk tolerance. But when risk was primed, risk-tolerant respondents were more supportive than those with less tolerance for risk.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we find that using a subtle prime to induce respondents to think about risk leads to a significant reduction in support for taking military action among those who are least tolerant of risk taking. Despite the fact that our results are confined to the single case of Darfur, they point to important implications. Specifically, when Americans think more about the risks associated with a military intervention, they may be less willing to support such an action. Yet, since much of the public does not pay a great deal of attention to foreign affairs, the risks involved in military interventions may not be easily accessed when people are asked to evaluate the time." It is necessary to include interaction terms for all of the variables that might be correlated with risk tolerance and the prime to ensure that our findings are not the result of omitted variable bias.
such proposals. This point intersects with the notion that elite rhetoric can be particularly influential when it comes to how the public evaluates military conflicts (Berinsky 2009 ). If there is not significant elite opposition to a proposed military intervention, then it is unlikely that Americans will hear enough about the potential risks involved in that intervention to cause them to seriously consider those risks. In such a situation, pollsters may register greater public support for an intervention than they would if Americans were giving more considerations to the risks Opinions about ongoing interventions can be based on objective indicators such as military casualties or elite interpretations of how the intervention is progressing, but the public must rely more on elite predictions about uncertain outcomes when formulating opinions about potential interventions. If few elites are discussing the risks of a potential intervention, then the public may give little thought to these risks. This makes it particularly challenging for pollsters and researchers to measure public opinion on proposed military interventions. Such opinions will be highly dependent on context-both the nature of elite discourse on the issue (i.e. whether elites are discussing the risks of intervention) and the nature of the survey instrument itself (i.e., whether the question primes respondents to think about risks). Given the gravity of a government's decision to engage in military conflict, it may be unwise to present policy makers they agree with statements such as "I would like to explore strange places" or "I like new and exciting experiences, even if I have to break the rules." Since respondents sometimes are unwilling or unable to provide accurate responses to such self-evaluative queries, we rely on the second approach, which captures a respondent's orientation to risk by asking him/her to participate in a hypothetical situation where he/she chooses between a probabilistic outcome and one that is certain. The two-question battery we use was pioneered by Barsky et al. (1997) , and a similar question was asked on the 1996 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
While the distribution of responses to our question is very similar to that reported by Barsky et al. (1997) , our sample does appear to be slightly more tolerant of risk. While Barsky et al. report that 65% of their respondents were least tolerant of risk, we find that 53% of our respondents fall into that group. Barsky et al. find 13% of their respondents falling into the most risk-tolerant category, whereas 17% of our sample falls into that category.
On one hand, the question we use in this paper avoids potential complications related to asking respondents for a self-assessment of their orientations toward risk. On the other hand, there may be a concern that we are only measuring one's orientation to taking financial risks fully address that possibility in this paper, we can address whether our measure has properties that are generally consistent with other measures that have been used in previous research. Kam and Simas (2010) find that measures of risk tolerance are usually negatively correlated with age and positively correlated with education and income. They also find that women are less tolerant of risk than men and respondents who are married are less tolerant than those who are not married. With the exception of income, our measure of risk tolerance is consistent with these patterns. Notably, income was uncorrelated with our risk tolerance scale, indicating that responses to the hypothetical job offer were not influenced by the respondent's current income. Table 2 while holding all other variables in the model at their means.
